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Abstract 
 This study examines the dynamic relationship between union elections and occupational safety 
among manufacturing establishments. Data on union elections come from the National Labor Relations 
Board, and data on workplace inspections and accident case rates come from the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration. The results indicate that union elections improved occupational safety. First, 
workplace inspections trended upwards before the election, then decreased immediately after the 
election, due almost entirely to employee complaints. Second, accident case rates were relatively stable 
before the election, then trended downwards after the election, due to accidents involving days away 
from work, job restrictions, and job transfers. These effects are evident regardless of the election 
outcome. Based on the value of statistical injury, the improvement in occupational safety is equivalent to 
an increase in the hourly wage between $0.47 and $2.62.  
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1 Introduction
Workers form labor unions to bargain over wages, employment, and working condi-
tions. While most research focuses on the determination of wages and employment (Farber,
1986), relatively little research focuses on working conditions. To address this limitation, this
study examines the effect of unions on occupational safety. As Morantz (2013) notes, unions
engage in numerous safety-enhancing activities, including pressuring employers to maintain
safe workplaces, educating workers about workplace hazards, and developing safety-related
innovations through economies of scale. The effect on occupational safety has direct impli-
cations for worker welfare and for the efficiency of labor unions. The effect is also relevant
to research on unions and wages (Branchflower and Bryson, 2004; DiNardo and Lee, 2004;
Frandsen, 2014; Freeman and Medoff, 1984), since occupational safety may affect wages
through compensating differentials (Kniesner and Leeth, 2014).
To plausibly identify the effect of unionization on occupational safety, this study
examines the dynamic relationship between union elections and occupational safety out-
comes. The identification assumption is that, by following the same establishments over
time, changes in safety outcomes are attributable to the union election and the election out-
come. Data on union elections come from the U.S. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
and data on occupational safety outcomes come from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). To determine whether an establishment exists in the years before
and after an election, the election data are matched to a national database of establishments
compiled by InfoUSA. The analysis is limited to manufacturing establishments that held a
union election in 1999 to 2010.
The study first examines the relationship between union elections and OSHA in-
spections. Data on inspections come from OSHA’s Integrated Management Information
System (IMIS). According to the analysis, inspections trended upwards before the election,
decreased immediately after the election, then trended downwards thereafter. Among estab-
lishments in which the election passed, the rate of inspections decreased from 18.10 percent
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in the 12 months before the election to 9.79 percent in the 12 months after the election. The
rise and fall in inspections was due almost entirely to employee complaints. Furthermore,
complaint-initiated inspections led to an increase in citations, suggesting that employee com-
plaints had merit. While these patterns are evident regardless of the election outcome, the
pattern is starker among establishments in which the election passed.
The analysis then examines the relationship between union elections and accident
case rates. Data on case rates come from the OSHA Data Initiative (ODI). The effect of
unionization is most evident for the DART rate, which includes cases involving days away
from work, job restrictions, and job transfers. According to the analysis, the DART rate was
relatively stable before the election, then trended downward immediately after the election.
Among establishments in which the election passed, the DART rate decreased from 8.76 in
the calendar year of the election to 5.67 in the fifth calendar year after the election, measured
per 100 full-time equivalent workers annually. The decrease in case rates is evident regardless
of the election outcome.
Taken together, the results suggest that union elections improved occupational
safety, leading to fewer complaint-initiated inspections and lower accident case rates. The
effects appear similar regardless of the election outcome, suggesting that the indirect ”threat”
effect of a union election - rather than the direct effect unionization - improved occupational
safety.
The improvements in occupational safety can be monetized using the implicit value
of statsitical injury. By period five, union elections decreased the DART rate by approxi-
mately 3 per 100 full-time equivalent workers. According to Viscusi and Aldy (2003), the
implicit value of statsitical injury ranges from $33 thousand to $182 thousand in 2010 dol-
lars.1 Thus, the improvement in occupational safety is valued at $99 thousand to $546
thousand. Based on a full-time work schedule of 2,000 hours per year, the improvement in
1Viscusi and Aldy (2003) derive the value of a statistical injury from approximately 30 studies. In
roughly one third of the studies, injuries are defined as those involving lost workdays, which is comparable
to DART cases. In the others, injuries are defined as any non-fatal injuries, any injuries, or injuries resulting
in a workers compensation claim.
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occupational safety is equivalent to an increase in the hourly wage between $0.50 and $2.73.
The median hourly wage among unionized workers in manufacturing was $20.70 (Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 2011), so union wages could be as much as thirteen percent higher after
accounting for improvements in occupational safety.
This study contributes to an existing literature on unionization and occupational
safety. Despite the numerous safety-enhancing activities of unions, most empirical studies
find that unionization is associated with greater accidents and injuries (Donado, 2015). One
possible explanation is selection, whereby more dangerous establishments are more likely
to unionize. A few studies find positive effects of unions on occupational safety, but these
findings pertain to specific eras and industries. The most recent study by Morantz (2013)
finds that unions decreased mining-related injuries and fatalities in the 1970s and 1980s.
However, the variation in union status is mostly between mines, rather than within, as
few coal mines transitioned between union and nonunion statuses. Thus, in comparison to
related studies, the study presented here is the first to exploit within-establishment variation
to examine the effect of union elections and unionization on occupational safety.
2 Background
2.1 Conceptual Framework of Unionization
Workers form labor unions to create or capture monopoly rents resulting from
imperfect competition in labor and product markets (Farber, 1986). A single union repre-
sents workers across multiple firms and establishments, forming national and increasingly
international coalitions. At the establishment level, union officials represent workers during
negotiations and help to enforce labor contracts. Labor contracts specify the terms and
conditions of employment, such as wages, employment, and working conditions.
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In the US, workers typically join unions through union elections.2 Elections are
facilitated by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), established in 1935 to enforce
collective bargaining laws. To hold an election, organizers must first demonstrate at least 30
percent support for a union election among eligible workers. This is achieved by petitions or
authorization cards. If successful, the NLRB determines the size and scope of the bargaining
unit and sets the time and location of the election. The election is conducted by secret ballot,
and a successful election requires a simple majority. If an election is successful, employers
must bargain “in good faith” with the union during contract negotiations.
A framework of union bargaining power is developed by DiNardo and Lee (2004). In
their framework, bargaining power is function of the share of workers who favor unionization.
In the baseline case, in which union elections are permitted, but none occur, bargaining power
increases monotonically with the vote share. If workers successfully petition for an election,
bargaining power increases with the vote share regardless of the election outcome. This is
referred to as the indirect “threat” effect of an election. If the union election is successful,
bargaining power increases further. This is referred to as the direct effect of unionization.
As DiNardo and Lee (2004) note, because a successful election requires a simple majority,
bargaining power increases discretely at the 50-percent vote share, assuming the direct effect
of unionization on bargaining power is non-zero.
In an analysis of union behavior, Farber (1986) considers two types of bargaining
structures. In the first structure, unions bargain over wages only, leaving employers to
determine employment levels and other conditions of employment. In this case, unions
negotiate along the employer’s demand curve, increasing wages and decreasing employment,
constrained by a non-negative-profit condition. However, the resulting labor contract is
generally inefficient, as one party can be made better off without negatively impacting the
other. In the second structure, unions bargain over both wages and employment. In this
case, unions negotiate along the employer’s isoprofit curve, decreasing wages and increasing
2In some cases, an employer will independently recognize a labor union, forgoing an election.
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employment relative to the demand curve. In this case, the resulting labor contract may be
efficient, but the net effect on wages and employment is ambiguous.
2.2 Unionization and Occupational Safety
Although economic research on unionization has focused mainly on wages and
employment, unionization could impact other aspects of employment such as occupational
safety. Indeed, unions engage in numerous safety-enhancing actvities, including pressuring
employers to maintain safe workplaces, educating workers about workplace hazards, devel-
oping safety-related innovations through economies of scale, and influencing the stringency
of regulatory oversight (Morantz, 2009). In regards to regulatory oversight, unions lobbied
for the establishment of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which
codifies and enforces occupational safety and health regulations (Mendeloff, 1980; Schurman
et al., 1998). Unionized establishments also face more frequent and rigorous inspections under
OSHA (Weil, 1991, 1992). In regards to education, unions increased awareness of the haz-
ards from exposure to coal dust, cotton dust, asbestos, radium, and dibromochloropropane
(Donado, 2015). And, at the establishment level, unions work directly with management
through safety and health committees, composed of workers, managers, and union officials
(Eaton and Nocerino, 2000).
Despite the safety-enhancing activities of unions, the causal effect of unions on
occupational safety is ambiguous. The conceptual framework is analogous to the discussion
of wages and employment. On one hand, unions may bargain over wages only. In this case,
employers may reduce investments in occupational safety as wage costs increase. On the other
hand, unions may bargain over both wages and occupational safety, potentially increasing
both. However, under certain conditions, unions may bargain for decreased occupational
safety in exchange for higher wages. The feasibility of such contracts depends, in part, on
whether occupational safety is monitorable.
In the empirical literature, scant evidence exists on the positive effects of unions on
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occupational safety. In fact, most studies find that unionization is associated with greater
accidents and injuries (Donado, 2015). The literature considers three primary explanations.
The first is selection, whereby establishments with greater accidents and injuries are more
likely to unionize (Hills, 1985). The second is reporting, whereby employers are more likely to
report accidents and injuries to federal agencies in the presence of union representation. This
may be due to the employer’s tendency to underreport, the union’s tendency to overreport,
or both. The third explanation, stated above, is that unions bid up wages in exchange for
safety.
A few studies find positive effects of unions on occupational safety, but these findings
pertain to specific eras and industries. For example, Boal (2009) examines turn-of-the-
century coal mining, and Fairris (1995) examines company unions in the 1920s. A more
contemporary study by Morantz (2013) focuses on mining-related injuries and fatalities in
the 1970s and 1980s. However, the variation in union status is mostly between mines, rather
than within, as few coal mines transitioned between union and nonunion statuses. Thus,
this study does not directly address the issue of non-random selection into unionization.
A particular concern is that dangerous mines are more likely to unionize, so the effect of
unionization on occupational safety would be biased downward.
3 Empirical Strategy
The empirical objective is to identify the effects of unions on occupational safety.
For identification, the empirical strategy uses an event-study model to exploit the timing
of union elections. The question is whether a union election distorts trends in occupational
safety outcomes before and after the election and, furthermore, whether the distortions vary
by the election outcome. The distortions among establishments in which the election fails
is attributed to the indirect effect of union elections, and the differential distortions among
establishments in which the election passes is attributed to the direct effect of unionization.
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A similar strategy is used by DiNardo and Lee (2004) to measure the indirect effect of union
elections on wages.
The event-study model is given by the following equation:
∑b ∑b
Yit = α + βXi + γPi + D
k k
itδ
P
k + PiDitδk + it. (1)
k=a k=a
The outcome variable Yit is a measure of occupational safety, measured for establishment
i at time period t. The term Xi is a vector of establishment characteristics, including
fixed effects for state, industry (measured by 3-digit NAICS code), and calendar year of the
election. The term Pi is an indicator of the election outcome, equaling one if the vote share
exceeds 50 percent and zero otherwise. The terms Dkit are indicators of periods before and
after the election, equaling one if an observation in time t is k periods from the election
and zero otherwise. The index k runs from a (< 0) periods before the election to b (> 0)
periods after the election. By setting δ−1 and δP−1 to zero, γ measures the regression-adjusted
difference just before the election between establishments with successful and unsuccessful
elections; the coefficients δk measure the change in the outcome relative to period −1 among
establishments in which the election fails; and the coefficients δPk measure the differential
change in the outcome relative to period −1 among establishments in which the election
passes.
By following the same establishments over time, the identification assumption is
that distortions to the trends in outcomes are a consequence of union elections. For ex-
ample, if an increase in workplace accidents precipitate a union election, then δk would be
increasingly negative with each k period before the election. If an election decreases subse-
quent workplace accidents, then δk would be increasingly negative with each k period after
the election. If the dynamics are the same regardless of the election outcome, meaning the
direct effects of unionization are zero, then δPk = 0 for all k periods. In any case, the trends
in the outcome by period will be presented graphically before estimating equation (1)
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4 Data
Data on union elections come from the NLRB. The data were downloaded from the
online repository www.data.gov, which contained election data for years 1999 to 2010. The
data report the number of eligible voters, the number of votes for and against unionization,
and the establishment’s name, address, and industry.
Data on occupational safety come from two sources. First, data on workplace
inspections come from OSHA’s Integrated Management Information System (IMIS). The
IMIS is a database of inspections dating back to 1972 and updated daily. The data report
the reason for the inspection, any citations or fines, and the establishment’s name, address,
and industry. In the entire database, fifty-six percent of inspections are programmed. These
inspections are preventive, intended to identify workplace hazards before an accident or
injury occurs, and are targeted based on establishment characteristics such as industry. An
additional eighteen percent of inspections are due to employee complaints, and four percent
are due to an accident or injury. The remaining inspections are due to imminent danger,
referrals from non-employees, and follow-ups of previous inspections.
Second, data on accident case rates come from OSHA’s Data Initiative (ODI). The
ODI began in 1996 to better target programmed inspections at high case-rate establishments.
Prior to the ODI, OSHA targeted inspections based on industry using data collected by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. However, upon inspection, many establishments in high case-rate
industries had relatively low case rates. To better target inspections, the ODI collected case-
rate data directly from employers, and these data were used to target inspections at high
case-rate establishments through OSHA’s Site Specific Targeting Plan (SST).3 From 1997 to
2011, The ODI surveyed approximately 80,000 establishments annually. The ODI excluded
establishments with fewer than 40 employees.4 The ODI data report the establishment’s
name, address, and industry. The case-rate data are compiled from records that employers
3Using ODI data and exploiting the SST plan, Li and Singleton (2017) examine the effect of workplace
inspections on worker safety.
4In 1997, this treshold was increasead to 60 employees.
8
are required to maintain under OSHA jurisidiction. The ODI reports two case rates. The
first is the total case rate (TCR), which includes cases involving death, days away from
work, job restrictions, job transfers, and medical attention beyond first aid. The second is
the DART rate, which includes cases involving days away from work, job restrictions, and
job transfers. As such, DART cases are a subset of TCR cases. Both rates are reported
annually per 100 full-time equivalent workers.
The empirical strategy requires that establishments are operative during the anal-
ysis period. For example, if there is no record of an inspection for an establishment after an
election, either the establishment no longer exists, or the establishment exists but was not
inspected. This is problematic for the empirical analysis if firm survival is systematically re-
lated to occupational safety. A particular concern is that, if more dangerous establishments
are less likely to survive, average safety would improve over time independent of union
elections. To address this issue, the election data are matched to a national database of
establishments compiled annually by InfoUSA. For establishments that match, the InfoUSA
data report the number of employees and year of establishment. The duration of survival
is determined by the reported year of establishment and matches to each annual database
from 1997 to 2013.
To separately identify the indirect and direct effects of union elections and union-
ization, respectively, the empirical strategy assumes that establishments with successful elec-
tions are more likely to unionize. To support this assumption, the election data are matched
to “notice of bargaining” data from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS).5
A notice is filed to create, terminate, or modify a labor contract and thus is an indicator of
union activity. The FMCS data are available for years 1997 to 2016.
5DiNardo and Lee (2004) similarly match union election data to the FMCS data.
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5 Sample
In total, the NLRB data contain information on 24,697 elections tallied from 1999
to 2010. The data are first restricted to establishments in the manufacturing sector. The
reason is three-fold. First, manfacturing has one of the highest rates of on-the-job injuries,
along with construction, mining, agriculture, and transportation. Second, the ODI covers
manufacturing, but not construction, mining, or agriculture. The ODI data contain just over
one million observations, and manufacturing accounts for 59.92 percent.6 Finally, the sample
would be comparable to that of DiNardo and Lee (2004), who focus on manufacturing estab-
lishments to study the effect of unionization on business survival, employment, productivity,
and wages. Of the 24,697 elections, 4,521 elections (18.31 percent) are in manufacturing; the
remainder is in construction (11.75 percent), transportation (14.14 percent), health (15.65
percent), and other. The data are also restricted to elections with at least 20 valid votes,
similar to DiNardo and Lee (2004) and Frandsen (2014). After these two restrictions, the
remaining sample contains 2,990 elections.
Summary statistics are presented in the first column of Table 1. Overall, 36.9
percent of elections were successful, with an average vote share in favor of unionization of
0.469. The density of the vote share is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the density by 5
percentage point increments from zero to one. As shown, the distribution is skewed slightly
to the right, with considerable bunching at one. There does not appear to be substantial
bunching just above or below the 50-percent cutoff.
Table 1 also presents summary statistics on industry and region. The most com-
mon industry by 3-digit NAICS code is food manfucturing (14.6 percent), followed by trans-
portaiton equipment, fabricated metal, and primary metal. Approximately one-third of
elections occurred in the Midwest, a quarter in the Northeast, and another quarter in the
South.
6Transportation accounts for 10.50 percent; trade accounts for 12.16 percent; health accounts for 14.28
percent.
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To determine the duration of firm survival, the election data are matched to the
InfoUSA database. The match rate is 58.5 percent, reported as the last figure in the first
column. Summary statistics of matched elections are presented in the second column. As
shown, the figures in the second column are similar to those in the first, suggesting that the
likelihood of a match to the InfoUSA database is not systematically related to the election
outcome or establishment characteristics. The column also reports two figures that are
derived from the InfoUSA data. These are employment size (214 employees on average) and
the percent of establishments that began less than ten years before the union election (40.3
percent).
The duration of establishment survival is determined by the reported year of es-
tablishment in the InfoUSA database and by matches to InfoUSA databases in years before
and after the union election. The duration of establishment survival, conditional on a match
to the InfoUSA database during the calendar year of the election, is illustrated in Figure 2.
The figure plots the percent of establishments that exist in each calendar year relative to
period zero, the calendar year of the election, separately by the election outcome. As shown,
the rates of entry and exit were high, regardless of the election outcome. Only 75.5 per-
cent of establishments existed five calendar years before the election, and only 56.5 percent
of establishments existed five calendar years after the election. Additionally, the duration
among establishments with successful elections was slightly shorter, due to both lower entry
before the election and higher exit after the election. The higher exit rate is consistent with
Frandsen (2014), who shows that establishments with successful union elections were less
likely to survive.
The dynamics of union activity, measured by filings with the FMCS, is illustrated in
Figure 3. Before the election, the share of filings increased slightly regardless of the election
outcome, reaching approximately five percent in the calendar year before the election. Filings
then spiked among establishments with successful elections, reaching 38.9 percent in the
calendar year of the election and 33.0 percent in the calendar year thereafter. In contrast,
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there was no spike in filings among establishments with unsuccessful elections. Thus, the
election outcome may be used to separately identify the direct effect of unionization from
the indirect effect of a union election.
6 Results
6.1 OSHA Inspections and Citations
The first measures of occupational safety are derived from administrative data on
OSHA inspections. The rates of any inspection by election outcome are illustrated in Figure
4. To illustrate inspection dynamics, the rates are plotted for 12-month intervals relative to
the month and year of the election, with period zero corresponding with the first 12 months
after the election.7 Importantly, the rates are conditional on firm survival. In panel one,
the sample is conditioned on survival from periods -2 to 1, 24 months before and after the
election (1,401 establishments). In panel four, the sample is conditioned on survival from
periods -5 to 4 (997 establishments). The panels illustrate how the rate of inspection changes
as the analysis duration expands.
The long-run dynamics are best illustrated in panel four. As shown, inspections
trended upwards before the election, decreased immediately after the election, then trended
downwards thereafter. This immediate decrease in inspections is evident regardless of the
election outcome, but is starker among establishments in which the election passed. Among
those establishments, inspections increased from 10.98 percent in period -5 to 18.10 percent
in period -1, then decreased to 9.79 percent in period zero. Inspections trended downwards
thereafter, reaching 8.61 percent by period four. Thus, in the long run, inspections were
lower.
The short-run dynamics in panel four are also evident in panels one through three,
7The relative timing of an inspection is determined using the month and year of the election reported in
the NLRB and the month and year of the inspection reported in the IMIS.
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where the sample is expanded to include establishments with shorter durations. In all panels,
inspections were greater before the election and decreased immediately after the election.
To understand how inspection dynamics in Figure 4 relate to unionization and
occupational safety, the rates of inspection are calculated separately by type. Three types of
inspection are considered: inspections due to employee complaints, programmed inspections,
and other. The rates, conditional on firm survival from periods -5 to 4, are illustrated in
Figure 5. (The rates conditional on shorter durations are available in the Appendix.) As
shown, the rise and fall in inspections was largely due to employee complaints. From period
-1 to 0, complaint-initiated inspections decreased from 9.20 percent to 4.15 percent among
establishments in which the election passed and from 6.06 percent to 4.09 percent among
establishments in which the election failed. In contrast, programmed and “other” inspections
do not appear systematically related to the timing of union elections.
Changes in inspection rates are quantified using the event-study model described
in equation (1). The model characterizes changes in inspections holding constant the state,
industry, and calendar year of the election. Estimates from the model, conditional on firm
survival from periods -5 to 4, are reported in Table 3. (Model estimates conditional on shorter
durations are available in the Appendix.) In column one, the outcome is any inspection; in
columns two through four, the outcome is inspection by type.
The estimates in the column one are consistent with Figure 4. According to the
coefficient on Pi, the indicator for a successful election, establishments in which the election
passed were 4.95 percentage points more likely to be inspected in period -1 than estabal-
ishments in which the election failed. Among the latter, inspections were relatively stable
before the election, then decreased after the election. By period four, inspections decreased
by 5.61 percentage points. Among establishments in which the election passed, the inspec-
tions increased by 7.13 percentage points (-0.0652-0.0061) before the election, from period
-5 to -1, then decreased by 10.4 percentage points (-0.0561-0.0389) after the election, from
period -1 to 4.
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As shown in columns two through four, the change in inspections is due predomi-
nately to complaints. Among establishments in which the election failed, complaint-initiated
inspections decreased by 3.18 percentage points after the election, from period -1 to 4. Among
establishments in which the election passed, complaint-initiated inspections increased by 5.05
percentage points before the election, from period -5 to -1, and decreased by 6.23 percentage
points after the election, from period -1 to 4. Both estimates are statistically significant at
the one percent level.
There are at least two interpretations for the pattern of complaint-initiated in-
spections. The first is that occupational safety steadily worsened leading up to the union
election, causing both an increase in employee complaints filed with OSHA and an eagerness
to unionize. In the wake of a union vote, employers responded by improving occupational
safety, decreasing employee complaints. The response of employers was similar regardless of
the election outcome, so the direct effect of unionization was negligible. The second possible
interpretation is that the desire to unionize strengthened before the union election, indepen-
dent of occupational safety. In this case, employees filed anonymous complaints with OSHA
to lobby or harrass employers (Smith, 1986). The lobbying effort ceased immediately after
the election, regardless of the outcome, leading to fewer employee-initiated inspections. The
major difference between the two interpretations is that, according to the former, occupa-
tional safety necessarily improved.
Support for the former interpretation is two-fold. First, for an employee complaint
to result in a workplace inspection, the complainant must provide a signed statement estab-
lishing reasonable grounds for a safety violation or allege a serious hazard that could result
in death or serious injury (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004). All other complaints are
resolved by phone or fax. Second, a study of inspection data finds that complaint-initiated
inspections were as productive as general inspections, measured by citations per inspection
(Smith, 1986).
To examine inspection productivity in this context, Figure 6 plots the percent
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of establishments that were inspected and cited for an OSHA violation. The rate of any
citation is presented in panel one. As shown, citations increased steadily before the election,
then decreased immediately after the election, similar to the pattern of complaint-initiated
inspections. The estimates of equation (1), with any citation as the outcome, are presented
in Table 3. Among establishments in which the election passed, citations increased by 4.55
percentage points before the election, from period -5 to -1, then decreased by 8.01 percentage
points after the election, from period -1 to 4. The rise and fall in citations, in tandem with
complaint-initiated inspections, suggests that employee complaints had merit.
To understand how the increase in inspections and citations may impact accident
case rates, the remaining panels of Figure 6 illustrate citation rates by type of violation. The
first is machinery, the second is environmental, and the third is other. The assumption is
that machinery violations are more related to workplace accidents, whereas environmental
violations are more related to illness, but not necessarily accidents. As shown, citations in all
three categories increased before the election, then decreased immediately after the election.
If the violations were remedied by the employer, particularly those related to machinery,
then it is plausible that accident case rates decreased as well.
6.2 Accident Case Rates
In the previous section, occupational safety is examined indirectly through OSHA
inspections. To examine occupational safety more directly, the analysis examines accident
case rates. However, even with accident case rates, the effect of unionization is ambiguous.
On one hand, unionization may improve occupational safety, leading to fewer accidents to
report. On the other hand, unions may compel employers to increase reports of accidents,
independent of occupational safety.
Data on accident case rates come from the ODI. Unlike OSHA inspections, which
are observed for each establishment in every period, accident case rates are only observed in
the period in which an establishment is surveyed. Thus, the ODI data constitute a synethic
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panel, where outcomes are observed for different establishments over time.
Manufacturing establishments observed in the ODI are not necessarily representa-
tive of manufacturing establishments with a union election. Thus, the third column of Table
1 reports summary statistics of establishments matched to the InfoUSA data and observed
in the ODI. As shown, the subset of establishments in column three are similar to those in
column two. One notable difference is employment size: 239 employees compared to 214.
The dynamic relationship between accident case rates and union elections is illus-
trated in Figure 7. The DART rate is plotted in the first panel, and the TCR is plotted in the
second panel. As mentioned, the DART rate includes cases involving days away from work,
job restrictions, and job transfers. The TCR rate, in addition to DART cases, includes cases
involving death and medical attention beyond first aid. Because the ODI are collected and
reported annually, period zero corresponds to the calendar year of the election, rather than
the first 12-months after the election. Accident case rates are conditional on firm survival
from periods -5 to 5. (Accident case rates conditional on shorter durations are available in
the Appendix.)
The most visually striking evidence is for the DART rate. As shown, the rate was
relatively stable before the election, but sharply trended downward after the election. This
pattern is evident regardless of the election outcome. From period 0 to 5, the DART rate
decreased from 8.76 to 5.67 among establishments in which the election passed and from
8.07 to 5.49 among establishments in which the election failed.
The figure of the TCR reveals a slightly different pattern. In contrast to the DART
rate, which was relatively stable before the election, the TCR steadily decreased. The
decrease largely reflects cases involving medical attention beyond first aid. This is because
cases involving medical attention are not included in the DART rate and because cases
involving death are uncommon. After the election, the TCR continues to decrease, but at a
slightly greater trend. The change may not be evident visually, given the larger scale of the
TCR figure relative to the DART figure, but is evident numerically. For example, among
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establishments in which the election passed, the TCR decreased by 2.90 (14.42-17.32) from
period -5 to 0 and by 4.87 (9.55-14.42) from period 0 to 5, a differential difference of 1.97
percentage points.
Changes in accident case rates are quantified using the event-study model described
in equation (1). The results are presented in Table 4. Estimates for the TCR are presented
in the first column, and estimates for the DART rate are presented in the second column.
Among establishments in which the election failed, the DART rate was relatively stable before
the election, but decreased steadily after the election. From period -1 to 5, the DART rate
decreased 2.91, a 38.5 percent decline relative to the average DART rate in period -1 of 7.52.
The pattern of the DART rate is similar among establishments in which the election passed,
as indicated by the statistically insignificant coefficients on the pass-by-period interactions.
The post-election estimates are slightly larger for the TCR, but this reflects the
pre-existing downward trend in the TCR that is not evident for the DART. The pre-existing
trend is approximately linear in Figure 7. Thus, to adjust for the pre-existing trend, the
pre-period coefficient can be subtracted from the corresponding post-period coefficient. For
example, among establishments in which the election failed, the estimate is 3.644 for period
-5 and -6.53 for period 5. Thus, the differential difference is -2.92 (p-value: 0.062).
Notably, the differential difference in the TCR is comparable to the absolute de-
cline in the DART rate after the election. Thus, the differential decline in the TCR is
largely attributable to DART cases involving days away from work, job restrictions, and job
transfers.
7 Conclusion
This study examines the dyanmic relationship between union elections and occupa-
tional safety among manufacturing establishments. The findings suggest that union elections
improve occupational safety. First, OSHA inspections and citations trended upwards before
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the election, then decreased immediately after the election, due almost entirely to employee
complaints. Second, accident case rates were relatively stable before the election, then
trended downwards immediately after the election, due to cases involving days away from
work, job restrictions, and job transfers. Importantly, these effects are evident regardless of
the election outcome, suggesting that the indirect ”threat” effect of a union election - rather
than the direct effect unionization - is sufficient to improve occupational safety. Using the
value of statistical injury (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003), the improvement in occupational safety
is equivalent to an increase in the hourly wage of $0.47 and $2.62 in 2010.
This study makes to main contributions to the related literature. First, this study
is the first to identify the effect labor unions on occupational safety by exploiting the timing
of union elections. By following the same establishments over time, the empirical strategy
addresses the issues of selection, whereby more dangerous firms are more likely to unionize.
Second, this study is one of only a few studies that provide suggestive evidence that labor
unions improve occupational safety. Indeed, most studies in the literature conclude that
unionization is associated with greater accidents and injuries (Donado, 2015). This study also
has implications for the literature on unions and wages, since improvements in occupational
safety may decrease wages through compensating differentials. If so, the union wage premium
may understate the total welfare gains from collective bargaining.
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Appendix
The data used in this study are compiled from several sources matched at the estab-
lishment level. The data on union election come from the NLRB; the data on occupational
safety come from OSHA’s IMIS and ODI; the data on firm survival come from the InfoUSA;
and the data on union activity come from the FMCS. This section describes the procedures
to match the data across sources.
The NLRB data contain union elections held from 1999 to 2010. The analysis
sample includes closed cases of representation petitions in manufacturing with 20 or more
valid votes. To link the NLRB data to other datasets, the establishment name and address
are standardized. For the establishment name, all the special characters and common words,
such as company, limited, and corporation, are first removed. If the listed formal name is
different from the case name, or the establishment is “doing business as (DBA) one under
another name, the second name is saved in a separate variable, and both names are used
when linking the election records to other datasets. In the street address variable, all the
special characters, and the floor, suite, and room numbers are removed. The common words,
such as street, avenue, and road, are replace with the abbreviations. The city names in the
election records are compared to a list of all the city names in the US from Census, and the
unmatched city names are manually checked for any misspelling.
To examine the effect of union on workplace safety, the NLRB data are linked to
inspection records from IMIS, establishment level injury rates from ODI, and records on
notices of bargaining from FMCS. The establishment name and address in IMIS, ODI, and
FMCS are first standardized using the same method when standardizing NLRB data. The
information used to match across datasets include establishment name, street, address, city,
state, and zip code. The matching is conducted in several steps using criteria from the exact
match to more relaxed criteria. The first round of matching is based on exact match of
name, street, city, and state. If a record in IMIS/ODI/FMCS is matched to a union election,
it is removed and not included in further rounds of matching. The second round of matching
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is based establishment name, zip code, city, and state. Then the records are matched based
on the first six letters of the name and address. The process is repeated for establishments
with multiple names.
To construct the indicator of firm survival, the NLRB data is matched to InfoUSA.
InfoUSA provides an annual list of all the active establishments operated in US from 1997 to
2003. Each establishment has a unique identifier, which can be used to link establishments
across years. The election records are first matched to the records in InfoUSA from the
calendar year of election using the matching procedures described above. The likelihood of
a successful match is higher in the year of election as a firm may stop operating thus do
not have a match in years after the election, or is newly founded at the time of election and
do not have a match in years prior to the election. When an establishment is matched to
a record in InfoUSA in the same calendar year, the unique identifier of the establishment is
used to check if the establishment has a record in InfoUSA in years prior to and after the
election. The establishments in InfoUSA report the year of establishment, which is also used
to determine the existence of an establishment in years prior to the election.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Establishments with Union Elections
All InfoUSA InfoUSA and ODI
Pass 0.369 0.365 0.357
Vote Share 0.469 0.469 0.468
Industry
Food 0.146 0.147 0.145
Primary Metal
Fabricated Metal
0.081
0.083
0.085
0.090
0.095
0.099
Transportation Equipment
Other
0.122
0.567
0.116
0.562
0.129
0.533
Region
Northeast 0.236 0.237 0.236
Midwest 0.369 0.387 0.417
South 0.237 0.212 0.206
West 0.159 0.164 0.141
InfoUSA 0.588 1.000 1.000
Employment size
Age ≤ 10 years
214
0.403
239
0.376
Observations 2990 1757 1237
Note: Union election data come from the NLRB. In column one, the sample is
restricted to elections in years 1999 to 2010. In column two, the sample is restricted
to establishments that are successfully matched to InfoUSA data in the year of
the election. In column three, the sample is further restricted to establishments
that are observed in the ODI in any year. Establishment age and employment
size come from the InfoUSA and thus are unknown for all establishments in the
column one.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Establishments by Election Outcome
Pass Fail
Food 0.148 0.146
Primary Metal
Fabricated Metal
0.092
0.090
0.082
0.091
Transportation Equipment
Other
0.129
0.540
0.108
0.574
Region
Northeast 0.246 0.232
Midwest 0.382 0.390
South 0.198 0.220
West 0.174 0.158
Employment size
Age ≤ 10 years
233
0.430
204
0.387
Observations 642 1115
Note: Union election data come from the NLRB. The
sample is restricted to elections in years 1999 to 2010
and to establishments that are successfully matched
to InfoUSA data in the year of the election.
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Table 3: Linear Probability Model of Inspection and Citation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inspection Complaint Programmed Other Citation
(Period -5) -0.0061 -0.0167 0.0227 -0.0076 -0.0061
(0.0182) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0090) (0.0161)
(Period -4) -0.0030 -0.0212 0.0212 0.0015 -0.0045
(0.0180) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0095) (0.0163)
(Period -3) 0.0030 -0.0242 0.0273 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0179) (0.0118)∗ (0.0123)∗ (0.0094) (0.0160)
(Period -2) 0.0061 -0.0091 0.0106 0.0061 0.0045
(0.0178) (0.0124) (0.0115) (0.0091) (0.0163)
(Period 0) -0.0258 -0.0197 -0.0121 0.0045 -0.0242
(0.0167) (0.0119) (0.0103) (0.0093) (0.0151)
(Period 1) -0.0364 -0.0242 -0.0061 -0.0015 -0.0303
(0.0172)∗ (0.0120)∗ (0.0108) (0.0093) (0.0156)
(Period 2) -0.0379 -0.0106 -0.0106 -0.0121 -0.0258
(0.0170)∗ (0.0123) (0.0102) (0.0083) (0.0151)
(Period 3) -0.0364 -0.0152 -0.0061 -0.0136 -0.0273
(0.0173)∗ (0.0124) (0.0094) (0.0085) (0.0153)
(Period 4) -0.0561 -0.0318 -0.0061 -0.0182 -0.0394
(0.0152)∗∗∗ (0.0106)∗∗ (0.0101) (0.0077)∗ (0.0147)∗∗
(Period -5)xPass -0.0652 -0.0338 -0.0316 -0.0043 -0.0622
(0.0320)∗ (0.0228) (0.0206) (0.0149) (0.0293)∗
(Period -4)xPass -0.0593 -0.0292 -0.0212 -0.0104 -0.0548
(0.0316) (0.0224) (0.0211) (0.0150) (0.0287)
(Period -3)xPass -0.0297 0.0005 -0.0243 -0.0089 -0.0356
(0.0331) (0.0248) (0.0215) (0.0149) (0.0296)
(Period -2)xPass -0.0387 0.0032 -0.0076 -0.0209 -0.0431
(0.0332) (0.0248) (0.0223) (0.0141) (0.0305)
(Period 0)xPass -0.0603 -0.0307 -0.0087 -0.0223 -0.0470
(0.0298)∗ (0.0227) (0.0204) (0.0138) (0.0283)
(Period 1)xPass -0.0200 -0.0262 0.0031 -0.0015 -0.0231
(0.0297) (0.0224) (0.0202) (0.0148) (0.0284)
(Period 2)xPass -0.0452 -0.0487 -0.0072 0.0032 -0.0514
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(0.0301) (0.0219)∗ (0.0201) (0.0129) (0.0286)
(Period 3)xPass -0.0556 -0.0442 -0.0147 0.0047 -0.0528
(0.0304) (0.0223)∗ (0.0186) (0.0130) (0.0282)
(Period 4)xPass -0.0389 -0.0305 -0.0177 0.0063 -0.0407
(0.0290) (0.0207) (0.0182) (0.0129) (0.0275)
Pass 0.0495 0.0317 0.0224 -0.0027 0.0486
(0.0248)∗ (0.0184) (0.0152) (0.0114) (0.0226)∗
Observations 9970 9970 9970 9970 9970
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The estimates are derived from an event-study model. The model measures the
likehood of an OSHA inspection during 12-month periods before and after a union election,
allowing the effect to differ by the election outcome. This is accomplished by including
period indicators (with period negative one, the twelve months prior to the union election,
as the left-out period), an indicator of a successful election, and interactions of the two.
The model also includes fixed effects for industry(3-digit NAICS codes), state, and calendar
year, and an indicator for establishment age less than ten years. The sample is restricted to
establishments that exist throughout the analysis period according InfoUSA data.
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Table 4: TCR and DART Rate
(1) (2)
TCR DART
(Period -5) 3.644 0.794
(1.221)∗∗ (0.665)
(Period -4) 1.604 -0.213
(1.039) (0.615)
(Period -3) 0.985 0.155
(0.934) (0.530)
(Period -2) -0.338 0.136
(0.710) (0.451)
(Period 0) -0.446 0.361
(0.643) (0.432)
(Period 1) -2.219 -0.672
(0.601)∗∗∗ (0.399)
(Period 2) -3.203 -1.277
(0.738)∗∗∗ (0.476)∗∗
(Period 3) -4.915 -2.255
(0.776)∗∗∗ (0.499)∗∗∗
(Period 4) -5.076 -2.264
(0.747)∗∗∗ (0.510)∗∗∗
(Period 5) -6.563 -2.910
(0.690)∗∗∗ (0.471)∗∗∗
(Period -5)xPass 0.295 -0.188
(2.239) (1.204)
(Period -4)xPass 0.501 1.004
(1.750) (1.125)
(Period -3)xPass 0.525 0.513
(1.550) (0.988)
(Period -2)xPass 0.933 0.301
(1.249) (0.829)
(Period 0)xPass 0.117 0.170
(1.212) (0.886)
(Period 1)xPass 1.446 0.657
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(1.221) (0.786)
(Period 2)xPass 0.801 0.603
(1.197) (0.828)
(Period 3)xPass 0.161 0.574
(1.311) (0.922)
(Period 4)xPass 1.082 0.983
(1.319) (0.887)
(Period 5)xPass 1.068 0.377
(1.262) (0.923)
Pass 0.478 0.541
(1.232) (0.845)
Observations 3151 3151
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The estimates are derived from an event-study model. The model measures case rates
during calendar years before and after a union election, allowing the effect to differ by the
election outcome. This is accomplished by including period indicators (with period negative
one, the calendar year prior to the union election, as the left-out period), an indicator of
a successful election, and interactions of the two. The model also includes fixed effects for
industry(3-digit NAICS codes), state, and calendar year, and an indicator for establishment
age less than ten years. The sample is restricted to establishments that exist throughout the
analysis period according InfoUSA data.
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Figure 1: Density of Vote Share
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
D
en
si
ty
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Vote Share
Note: Union election data come from the NLRB. The sample is restricted to elections in years 1999 to 2010.
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Figure 2: Match Rate to InfoUSA by Period
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Note:The figure illustrates establishment formation and dissolution in calendar years before and after the
union election, with period zero corresponding to the year of the election. Years of formation and
dissolution are based one data from InfoUSA.
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Figure 3: Match Rate to FMCS by Election Outcome and Period
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Note: The figure illustrates the match rate of establishments to FMCS data in calendar years before and
after the union election, with period zero corresponding to the year of the election. A match to the FMCS
indicates union activity in that year.
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Figure 4: Inspections by Period, Any
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Note: The figure illustrates OSHA inspections in 12-month increments before and after the union election,
with period zero corresponding to the first 12 months after the election. Each panel corresponds to
successively longer analysis periods, and the sample is restricted to establishments that exist throughout
the analysis period according InfoUSA data.
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Figure 5: Inspections by Period, InfoUSA -5 to 4
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Note: The figure illustrates OSHA inspections and citations in 12-month increments before and after the
union election, with period zero corresponding to the first 12 months after the election. The sample is
restricted to establishments that exist throughout the analysis period according InfoUSA data.
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Figure 6: Citations by Period, InfoUSA -5 to 4
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Note: The figure illustrates OSHA citations in 12-month increments before and after the union election,
with period zero corresponding to the first 12 months after the election. The sample is restricted to
establishments that exist throughout the analysis period according InfoUSA data.
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Figure 7: Accident Case Rates by Period
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Note: The figure illustrates average case rates during calendar years before and after the union election,
with period zero corresponding to the year of the election. The total case rate (TCR) reflects cases
involving death, days away from work, job restrictions, job transfers, and medical attention beyond first
aid. The DART rate reflects cases involving days away from work, job restrictions, and job transfers. The
sample is restricted to establishments that exist throughout the analysis period according InfoUSA data.
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